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LESSONS FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY DIFFUSION FOR CARBON
DIOXIDE REMOVAL DEVELOPMENT
Anthony E. Chaveza1

ABSTRACT
To avoid the diastrous affects of climate
change, society will need to deploy carbon dioxide
removal technologies (“CDR”), quite probably in
large quantities. However, CDR technologies are
undeveloped and deployed at only fractions of the
amount necessary. Thus, we need to establish a set of
policies that will accelerate the development and
deployment of CDR. Patterns of technology diffusion
provide important insight into the development of
effective policies to promote the innovation and
installation of new technologies. The dissemination of
new technologies tends to follow a recurring pattern
called the S curve. This pattern includes a slow initial
adoption, a take-off phase, and then slow dissemination
to the remaining population. Recently, experience with
the development of renewable energy followed this
pattern. Renewable energy’s growth not only
demonstrates this diffusion pattern, it reveals the
effectiveness of certain policies that promoted
diffusion. It also illustrates the difficulties that can
arise when policies do not match a technology’s
location on the S curve.

a1
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INTRODUCTION
This paper will consider the possible effectiveness of these
policies in developing carbon dioxide removal technologies. In an
earlier paper, I looked at renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”),
which mandate quantities of renewables, as a means to incentivize
deployment. Accordingly, this paper will focus on price regulations,
typically in the form of price subsidies (“FITs”) or tenders
(competitive auctions). It also considers secondary policies – primarily
tax credits and cash grants – that enhance the effectiveness of the
primary policy.
This review of renewable energy diffusion and the policies that
supported it helps to construct a set of principles and policies that can
accelerate the diffusion of CDR technologies. These policies will need
to reflect the differentiation of technologies and geographic resources,
provide a stable policy environment to encourage investment, and
incorporate mechanisms to respond to changing technological and
market conditions.
Many aspects of renewable energy policies should be able to
facilitate CDR development. RPSs can provide an overall structure
that will assure installations continue at a steady pace. They also
incentivize acquisition of the lowest-cost technologies, that help
contain overall expenditures and encourage continued innovation.
FITs provide long-term subsidies that assure profitability, thereby
encouraging investment into new technologies. Secondary policies,
such as tax credits and cash grants, should be included because of their
recognized effectiveness in enhancing the effectiveness of primary
policies. As the CDR technologies mature, their costs will decline, thus
causing a rush to install reduced-cost technologies at price-supported
rates. Not only must the supporting policies be adjusted to contain their
overall costs, governments should also transition to different policies
that better reflect the new market realities. Thus, as technologies
mature, FITs should be phased out in favor of policies, such as
auctions, that can reduce installation prices.
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DEVELOPMENT OF CDR IS CRUCIAL BUT OCCURING TOO
SLOWLY

Because we have failed to rein in greenhouse gas emissions,
planetary warming is likely to exceed either the 1.5°C target required
to avoid significant climate changes or even the 2°C target of the Paris
Agreement. Most analyses conclude that to stay below these levels, we
will need to deploy carbon dioxide (“CDR”) removal technologies.
Unfortunately, these technologies are largely underdeveloped and few
have been installed. Consequently, the number of installations must
increase dramatically to sequester carbon at the rate required.
A.

Surpassing Carbon Emissions Targets

Despite recent efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
scientists still project that we will not avoid dangerous climate change.
Models that demonstrate that this result is still avoidable almost
exclusively rely upon carbon dioxide removal options to stay below
this level of warming. Although a number of CDR technologies are
theoretically possible, they all have limitations. More germane here,
they all remain far from the level of development and installation
required.
The parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement agreed to aim to hold
the rise in warming to “well below 2.0°C.”1 They further agreed to
pursue efforts to hold warming to 1.5°C.2 Recent analyses indicate that
even warming to the 1.5°C level will cause serious regional
consequences, such as extreme temperature warming, heavy
precipitation, and droughts.3 The Paris Agreements and earlier global
pacts targeted a rise of 2.0°C as the level to avoid because at that level
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” will
be unavoidable.4 Failure to hold warming to 1.5°C could result in
additional global damages costing between $8 to $38 trillion by
midcentury.5
1

Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCC Conference of the Parties,
21st Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), art. 2(1)(a) (Paris
Agreement) http://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/paris_agreement.pdf.
2
Id.
3
Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al., Global Warming of 1.5°C,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (2018).
4
Lena R. Boysen et al., The Limits to Global-Warming Mitigation by
Terrestrial Carbon Removal, 5 EARTH’S FUTURE 463, 463 (2017).
5
Masson-Delmotte et al., supra note 3 at 256.
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Unfortunately, temperature rises of this magnitude are
becoming increasingly likely. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) concluded that we can emit only an
additional 1,000 Gt of CO2 between 2011 and 2100 while retaining a
66% chance of keeping warming under 2°C.6 With annual emissions
approximating 37.5 Gt of CO2,7 society already emitted one-fifth of
this amount in just five years.8 Thus, scientists have estimated that our
emissions will ensure a 1.5°C temperature rise in no more than 20
years, and possibly much sooner.9
Consequently, integrated assessment models developed by the
IPCC in its Fifth Assessment Report revealed that deployment of CDR
technologies are likely a critical component for avoiding the 2°C level
at the end of the century. The IPCC noted that 166 of 900 integrated
assessment models yielded a 66% chance of warming not exceeding
the 2°C level in 2100. 101 of these models required CDR to achieve
this result.10 In fact, they rely upon CDR ramping up rapidly before
midcentury to meet this target.11
Although 2100 is still many decades away, efforts to develop,
test, and deploy CDR – at scale – must commence shortly. The IPCC
models indicate that keeping warming below 1.5°C will require largescale deployment of CDR within 10 to 20 years.12 Even some
projections to hold warming to 2.0°C will necessitate CDR
deployment to begin as soon as the current decade.13
6

EUROPEAN ACADAMIES SCIENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL COMMITTEE
[EASAC], Negative Emission Technologies: What Role in Meeting Paris
Agreement Targets?, 35 EASAC POL’Y REP. 1, 4 (2018).
7
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME [UNEP], The Emissions Gap Report 2019 3
(2019) [hereinafter UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019].
8
EASAC, supra note 6, at 5.
9
David Kramer, Negative Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 73 PHYSICS TODAY
44, 45 (2020).
10
Christopher B. Field & Katharine J. Mach, Rightsizing Carbon Dioxide
Removal, 356 SCIENCE 706, 707 (2017).
11
NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE
[NAS], NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECH. AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION: A RES.
AGENDA 9 (2019).
12
R. Stuart Haszeldine et al., Negative Emissions Technologies and
Carbon Capture and Storage to Achieve the Paris Agreement Commitments, 376
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1, 19–20 (2018).
13
Matthew D. Eisaman, et al., Indirect Ocean Capture of Atmospheric
CO2: Part II. Understanding the Cost of Negative Emissions, 70 INT’L J. OF
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL (2018),
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The State of CDR Technologies

Carbon dioxide removal consists of a range of practices and
technologies that can reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Costs and physical limitations, however, are likely to
prevent any single technology from providing a “magic bullet”
solution. Consequently, we will need to develop and deploy a portfolio
of technologies.
CDR technologies remove CO2 from the atmosphere and
sequester it underground permanently.14 These technologies fall into
two categories. The first involves methods that augment natural
processes.15 The second utilizes technological means to capture and
bury the carbon dioxide.16
Although research on carbon dioxide removal is ongoing, the
most promising approaches fall within the following eight
categories:17
•

Afforestation and reforestation – Afforestation involves the
planting of forests on grasslands or shrublands, and
reforestation occurs when forests are planted on lands
converted from forests to other purposes.18 The amount of CO2

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323636712_Indirect_ocean_capture_of_a
tmospheric_CO_2_Part_II_Understanding_the_cost_of_negative_emissions.
14
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL [NRC],OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIS REMOVAL AND RELIABLE
SEQUESTRATION 33 (2015) (Carbon capture and utilization systems, on the other
hand, apply the captured CO2 to a number of processes, including enhanced oil
recovery, mineral carbonation, food and beverage carbonation, polymer processing,
microalgae production, and enhanced coal bed methane recovery.); Jennifer Wilcox
et al., Assessment of Reasonable Opportunities for Direct Air Capture, 12 ENVTL.
RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
NAS, supra note 11, at 45 (Another approach gaining attention recently
is Coastal Blue Carbon. This consists of tidal wetlands and seagrasses, which
capture and sequester carbon through plant growth and the subsequent burial of this
plant organic carbon residue.); Id. at 46 (While these areas are among the most
robust on earth at sequestering carbon, their current global sequestration totals only
0.84 GtCO2 per year.); Id. at 47 (However, scientists have projected that this rate
could more than double through the restoration and creation of coastal wetlands.).
18
UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A UN Environment Synthese
Report 60 (2017.) [hereinafter UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017]; NRC supra
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removed from the atmosphere by forestation depends upon a
number of factors, including the availability of sufficient land,
nutrients,19 and water;20 type and age of the trees;21 and
precipitation and CO2 levels.22 Possible sequestration from
these activities could range from 1.5 to 14 GtCO2 (billion tons
of carbon dioxide) per year by 2030.23
•

Biochar – Pyrolysis stabilizes biomass in biochar, which is
then buried in soil.24 Biochar constitutes a negative emissions
technology because it fixes atmospheric CO2 in a stable form
that can be easily sequestered.25 Additionally, biochar can
provide several co-benefits. These include increasing soil
fertility and improving water and nutrient retention.26 Scientists
project that biochar can sequester as much as 1 GtCO2 per year
by 2030, and possibly up to 9.5 GtCO2, by 2100.27

•

Bioenergy carbon capture and sequestration (“BECCS”) –
Combining carbon capture and sequestration technology with
the burning of biomass in the form of agricultural and forest
residues, municipal wastes, and cultivated crops in power
plants can have net negative CO2 emissions.28 Since biomass
burning is in theory carbon neutral, and in practice low
carbon, the capture and sequestration of the system’s

note 14, at 39 (These processes are necessitated by deforestation, which causes
approximately 10% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.).
19
EASAC, supra note 6, at 17.
20
Duncan McLaren, Negatonnes—An Initial Assessment of the Potential
For Negative Emission Techniques to Contribute Safely and Fairly to Meeting
Carbon Budgets in the 21st Century, 1 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH 1, 20 (2011),
http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/shs/Climatechange/Carbon%20sequestration/negat
onnes.pdf.
21
NRC, supra note 14, at 40 (In general, net CO2 removal peaks within
30-40 years, and then it declines to zero as the forest matures. ).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 62.
25
Niall McGlashan et al., High-Level Techno-Economic Assessment of
Negative Emissions Technologies, 90 PROCESS SAFETY & ENVTL. PROTECTION
501, 503 (2012),
26
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 62.
27
McGlashan, supra note 25, at 503.
28
Matthew C. Nisbet, The Carbon Removal Debate, INST. FOR CARBON
REMOVAL L. AND POL’Y 1, 9 (Dec. 2019),
https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/carbon-removal/upload/carbon-removaldebate.pdf.
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emissions results in net negative emissions.29 A critical
advantage of BECCS as a carbon dioxide removal technology
is that it also produces a salable product, electricity.30 BECCS
could sequester between 2 and 18 GtCO2 per year.31
•

Direct air capture and carbon sequestration (“DACCS”) –
This involves directly capturing ambient air, separating the
CO2, and then sequestering it underground.32 DACCS
technology is still at the developmental stage. While it may
eventually provide up to half of the required CO2 storage, it
will necessitate significant energy and land resources to
operate at this scale.33 DACCS has the technical potential to
sequester as much as 20 GtCO2 annually, but actual
sequestration is most likely to range from 2 to 5 GtCO2 per
year.34

•

Enhanced weathering – Atmospheric CO2 naturally forms a
chemical bond with reactive minerals.35 The natural
weathering process will remove atmospheric carbon, but it will
require 100,000 years to return the climate to its preindustrial
level.36 Enhanced weathering augments the natural weathering
process. It involves mining and grinding particular minerals to
small grain sizes to increase their surface area exposed for
weathering.37 This method likely can sequester only 0.7 to 3.7
GtCO2 per year.38

29

McLaren, supra note 20, at 17.
McGlashan, supra note 25, at 504.
31
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 62;. see also
Elmar Kriegler et al., Is Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Removal a Gamer Changer
for Climate Change Mitigation?, 118 CLIMATE CHANGE 45-57, 55 (May, 2013)
(projecting BECCS deployment limited to a removal of 14-15 GtCO2 per year).
32
NAS, supra note 11, at 39.
33
Kramer, supra note 9, at 49.
34
Id. at 64.
35
NAS, supra note 11, at 39.
36
Jeremy Deaton, Earth’s “Weathering Thermostat” Keeps Climate in
Check Over Very Long Periods of Time, CLEANTECHNICA (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://cleantechnica.com/2017/09/18/earths-weathering-thermostat-keeps-climatecheck-long-periods-time/.
37
Jessica Strefler et al., Potential and Costs of Carbon Dioxide Removal
by Enhanced Weathering of Rocks, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1–2 (2018).
38
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 64.
30
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•

Land management – Soils lose carbon through oxidation, such
as when they are plowed.39 In fact, agricultural practices are
responsible for 10-12% of anthropogenic greenhouse gases.40
Appropriate land management practices can increase soil
carbon capture and reduce soil carbon losses.41 These practices
include accelerating regeneration after disturbance and
lengthening crop rotations.42 Possible sequestration from
agricultural land management practices may be as high as 5.2
GtCO2 per year.43

•

Ocean alkalinity enhancement – Adding alkaline materials to
the ocean increases the amount of carbon the ocean absorbs.44
Ocean alkalinity enhancement accelerates ocean carbon uptake
and at the same time reverses ocean acidification.45 If operated
at the appropriate scale, this method could sequester sufficient
carbon to return the atmosphere to its pre-industrial state.46

•

Ocean fertilization – Depositing nutrients, such as iron,
nitrogen or phosphorous, into the ocean stimulates the growth
of phytoplankton, which consume CO2.47 Scientists project that
ocean fertilization could remove up to 3.7 GtCO2 per year.48

Several considerations regarding these technologies are
important. First, we cannot rely upon developing a single technology;
instead, will need to develop a portfolio of technologies.49 Second,
39

McLaren, supra note 20, at 21.
Stefan Frank et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Agriculture
Without Compromising Food Security?, 12 ENVT’L. RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017).
41
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 61.
42
NAS, supra note 11, at 39.
43
NRC, supra note 14, at 44.
44
Id.
45
Andrew Lenton, et al., Assessing Carbon Dioxide Removal through
Global and Regional Ocean Alkalinization under High and Low Emission
Pathways, 9 EARTH SYS. DYMANICS 339, 340 (2018).
46
T. Kruger, Increasing the Alkalinity of the Ocean to Enhance its
Capacity to Act as a Carbon Sink and to Counteract the Effect of Ocean
Acidification, GEOCONVENTION 4 (2010),
http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/abstracts/pdf/2014/90172cspg/abstracts/ndx_k
rug.pdf.
47
EASAC, supra note 6, at 27.
48
NRC, supra note 14, at 61.
49
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019, supra note 7, at 3 (This is apparent
for several reasons. First, current global CO2 emissions approximate 37.5 GtCO2
40
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physical constraints limit the actual amount of CO2 that every method
can sequester.50 Third, “significant scientific gaps” exist for nearly all
CDR technologies.51 Fourth, few CDR methods, if any, are ready to be
deployed at the scale required.52
Thus, while we can anticipate the need to utilize CDR
technologies, they remain substantially underdeveloped. We need to
institute policies that will encourage CDR’s development and
deployment..

per year.); NAS, supra note 11, at 4 (As indicated above, no single technology,
except possibly ocean alkalinization, will be able to keep pace with these annual
emissions, let alone actually reduce the amount of atmospheric CO 2. Furthermore, a
broad portfolio of technologies will be less expensive and less disruptive;
diversification will also help manage the risks of untested technologies.).
50
UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019, supra note 7, at 10-11; EASAC,
supra note 6, at 12-13 (For several such limitations. In addition, several CDR
approaches may compete with one another. BECCS, afforestation, reforestation,
DACCS, and enhanced weathering all may draw upon the same land and water
resources.); McLaren, supra note 20, at 17 (Moreover, methods that rely upon
reactions with minerals – such as weathering and alkalinization – may confront
limitations deriving from the quantity of minerals that must be extracted,
processed, and transported.).
51
NAS, supra note 11, at 13;. Haszeldine, et al., supra note 12, at 11
(Many CDR technologies are little more than concepts and operate only as pilot
projects.); NAS, supra note 11, at 7 (Some have not yet even been tried in the
field.).
52
Vassilis Stavrakas, Niki-Artemis Spyridaki & Alexandros Flamos,
Striving towards the Deployment of Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage
(“BECCS”): A Review of Research Priorities and Assessment Needs,
SUSTAINABILITY MDPI 2 (2018) (BECCS, for example, is considered among the
most promising of the CDR technologies.); Wil Burns & Simon Nicholson,
Bioenergy and Carbon Capture with Storage (“BECCS”): the Prospects and
Challenges of an Emerging Climate Policy Response, 7 J. Envt’l. Stud. & Sci. 527,
529 (2017) (Current BECCS operations, however, consist of only fifteen pilot
plants and one commercial plant.); Nisbet, supra note 28, at 7 (Nevertheless, the
IPCC scenarios that rely on BECCS to keep warming under 2.0°C require that
BECCS plants be deployed in the tens of thousands over the next few decades.);
Glen P. Peters et al., Key Indicators to Track Current Progress and Future
Ambition of the Paris Agreement, 121 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 4 (2017)
(Similarly, these scenarios anticipate that several thousand DACCS plants will be
operating by 2030; planned construction, however, only numbers in the tens.); Niall
R. McGlashan et al., Negative Emissions Technologies, GRANTHAM INST. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE BRIEFING PAPER NO 8 LONDON IMPERIAL COLLEGE 1, 15 (Oct.
2012) (Finally, deploying biochar at the necessary scale would require an increase
of over 63 times the current charcoal production capacity.).
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DIFFUSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

To best encourage the development and deployment of CDR
technologies, we need to consider the historic patterns of technology
diffusion. The distribution of new technologies typically follows a
recurring pattern. These patterns proceed on a path reflecting the
technologies’ initial uncertainty, acceleration of their adoption as they
become technologically mature, and then saturation of the market.
Researchers have recognized a number of factors that drive these
patterns. Examining these patterns informs expectations for future
technology dissemination, the choice of policies to accelerate their
distribution, the means to augment their diffusion, and inflection
points where policies may need to change.
Technology “diffusion” identifies the process by which “an
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among
members of a social system.”53 Diffusion modeling informs the
understanding of technology growth.54 It illustrates that the market
share of new technologies does not grow linearly; instead, it typically
follows an “S” shape.55
Gabriel Tarde first developed diffusion theory in 1903,
recognizing the S shape that it follows.56 Subsequently, scientists have
applied diffusion models to analyze the adoption of numerous
technologies, including cars, televisions, computers, other consumer
goods, and non-commercial phenomena.57 Applying diffusion-models
53

G. Joga Rao, S.K Shrivastava, & Gouse Baig, Diffusion Modeling and
Implementation of Renewable Energy Technologies in India, 3 INT’L ADVANCED
RES. J. IN SCI., ENGINEERING & TECH. 106, 110 (2016).
54
K. Usha Rao & V.V.N. Kishore, A Review of Technology Diffusion
Models with Special Reference to Renewable Energy Technologies, 14
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 1070, 1075. (2010).
55
Stephen W. Davies & Ivan Diaz-Rainey, The Patterns of Induced
Diffusion: Evidence from the International Diffusion of Wind Energy, 78 TECH.
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 1227, 1235 (2011)..
56
Cinderella Dube & Victor Gumbo, Diffusion of Innovation and the
Technology Adoption Curve: Where Are We? The Zimbabwean Experience, Bus. &
Mgmt. Stud. vol. 3, No. 3 (Sept. 2017) 34-52, 36 (Technology diffusion derives
from the recognition of growth patterns of cell colonies in a medium. Colony
growth reaches a saturation point because of nutrient or space limitations.
Similarly, technology diffusion levels off as it approaches the number of potential
adopters.); Rao, supra note 73, at 110.
57
Dube, supra note 56 (These non-commercial phenomena includes
things such as fatal car accidents, major nuclear accidents, and deaths from AIDS.).
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analysis helps design and assess supporting policies.58 For instance,
new technologies typically require initial supporting policies before
achieving diffusion and maturity, and maintaining these policies
during later stages may be counterproductive.59
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, economists became more engaged in
diffusion analysis. They especially focused on understanding the
patterns of diffusion.60 The general pattern of technology diffusion
consists of a slow start, acceration to a peak, and then a slowing as
saturation occurs.61 Analysts refer to this pattern as the S curve, as
reflected below:
Figure 162

58

Rao, supra note 54, at 1075.
Stéphane Isoard & Antonio Soria, Technical Change Dynamics:
Evidence from the Emerging Renewable Energy Technologies, 23 ENERGY ECON.
619, 631 (2001).
60
Davies & Diaz-Rainey, supra note 75, at 1229.
61
International Energy Agency [IEA], Deploying Renewables
201120112011: Best and Future Policy Practice 97 (2011) [hereinafter IEA,
Deploying Renewables].
62
The Adoption Curve, INVESTAURA (Aug. 15, 2019),
http://www.business-planning-for-managers.com/main-courses/marketingsales/marketing/the-adoption-curve/.
59
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The S curve begins with a relatively flat inception stage. During this
stage, the technology first appears in commercial markets. Costs,
however, remain relatively high, suppressing purchases.63 Next, in the
take-off phase, the market for the technology expands quickly, and
costs begin to fall.64 In the final stage, consolidation,65 growth flattens
as the market approaches saturation.66 Development of renewable
energy followed the S-curve pattern, as evidenced by its rate of
adoption. Production of the first trillion watts of renewable energy
required 40 years; the second trillion needed only 5 years.67
As technologies progress through these stages, different
barriers to deployment arise, often necessitating adjustments to
supporting policies.68 During the inception phase, developers focus on
establishing the costs and potential of technologies. Typically, this
involves the construction of pilot or demonstration plants, developing
the requisite administrative infrastructure to process related permit
applications, and establishing the necessary supply chains.69 Policy
considerations in the inception phase include policies that set the
groundwork for long-term favorable conditions and that compensate
for the high costs at this stage.70
The take-off phase presents different challenges. During this
stage, the infrastructure investments of the inception phase facilitate
fast growth of installed capacity until markets approach saturation.71
At this stage, policies must be stable yet flexible. Stability is necessary
to maintain investor confidence;72 flexibility is required because

63

IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 97.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Rao, supra note 53, at 110.
67
Jeremy Hodges, Global Green Energy Capacity Surpasses a Trillion
Watts, BLOOMBERG L. ENV’T. & ENERGY REP. (Aug. 2, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/global-green-energycapacity-surpasses-a-trillion-watts.
68
IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 97-98.
69
Id. at 101.
70
Id. at 101-02 (A particular concern at this stage is the technological
“valley of death,” during which technologies requiring large scale demonstration
lack the requisite financing. These risks especially arise for large-scale projects that
require substantial funding to develop and construct demonstration models.).
71
Id. at 110.
72
Id. at 103; Davies, supra note 55, at 1236. (The most successful systems
have had such policy continuity.).
64
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support costs can rise dramatically as deployments take off. 73 Either
flexible policies or those that are transitional in nature best respond to
issues arising at this stage.74 Accordingly, at this stage incentives must
decrease over time to prevent policy costs from skyrocketing.75
Finally, in the saturation or consolidation stage, the issues are
much simpler. At this stage, most of the market has already adopted
the technology, and the remaining market consists of last adopters,
identified as “laggards.”76 Thus, the issues largely consist of
dissemination to these remaining adopters and integration of the
technologies at substantial levels of adoption.77
Over time, economists have refined their analysis of diffusion
patterns, focusing on inducing diffusion, accelerating diffusion, and
identifying diffusion pivot points. Induced diffusion involves
interventions that alter the speed or total level of diffusion of an
innovation.78 Although physical limitations can cap diffusion levels,
government policies targeting specific technologies can accelerate
diffusion.79 Induced diffusion can result from policies that facilitate
adoption or sustain the adoption process.80 Graphically, the changes to
the typical S curve engendered by induced diffusion involve a shifting
of the curve to the left (accelerated diffusion) or a higher end point
(increased saturation).81 Absent sufficient policy interventions,
diffusion will follow the typical pattern. Strong policy inducements,
however, can favorably reshape the diffusion curve.82
The success of induced diffusion can depend upon a number of
considerations, including supporting policies.83 Prime examples of the
interaction of policy and diffusion come from the development of
73

IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 102.
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renewable energy. Many European countries successfully induced the
diffusion of wind power.84 During its inception, these countries
provided financial incentives for demonstration wind projects.85 The
most successful European nations in inducing wind power’s diffusion
enacted feed-in tariffs (“FITs”).86 Characteristics of FITs that
facilitated diffusion included revenue certainty, policy continuity, and
removal of non-price (primarily grid access) barriers.87 Support
measures such as FITs helped renewable energy costs to decline,
creating new demand. This triggered learning by doing88 and
economies of scale,89 which pushed costs down further.90
Research into diffusion of renewable energy has identified
several factors that facilitate cost reductions. These included
experience with the technology, as exhibited through a learning curve
analysis, and economies of scale.91 Technologies proceed down the
learning curve in a recurring pattern. Research and development
facilitate initial cost declines; then, performance standards dominate,
and price reductions drive demand.92 As developers gain more
experience with new technologies, they are able to increase
84
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86
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ENERGY POL’Y 1557, 1559–76, 1559 (2005) (In addition, labor becomes more
skilled at production.) (These improvements also can generate positive feedbacks,
which further benefit product development.).
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productivity through R&D, experimentation, and implementation.93
This reduces time and labor costs, lowering unit costs of production.94
Awareness of the S-curve pattern informs policy development
for technology incentivization and diffusion. Specifically, it indicates
that the growth of technologies will usually follow a nonlinear pattern.
Consequently, slow initial growth is foreseeable and should not, by
itself, trigger policy changes.95 Policy stability enhances effectiveness.
In fact, policy stability is a more important determinant of diffusion
than financial support.96 Conversely, regular changes to policies limit
their effectiveness.97
Renewable energy diffusion exhibited many of these
characteristics. Government policies facilitated its development to the
point where costs dropped as a result of learning and mass
production.98 Renewables then proceeded along a path of research and
development, demonstration models, market introduction, and
diffusion.99 Economists have estimated that research and development,
economies of scale, and learning-by-doing accounted for 60 percent of
the cost decline of solar photovoltaic panels from 1980 to 2012.100
Over a slightly longer period (1975 to 2015), the cost of PVs dropped
99 percent.101 As the technology improved, economies of scale became
the dominant source of cost reductions.102
The government policies that facilitated renewable energy
diffusion included supply-side and demand-side approaches. Supply
93
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side policies facilitate delivering new technologies to markets.103 Price
subsidies are classic examples of such policies, and they can play
critical roles in facilitating diffusion.104 Among such subsides, FITs
especially have been successful in promoting diffusion by encouraging
learning and reducing costs.105 Demand-side policies directly target
consumption of the technology. For instance, renewable portfolio
standards (“RPSs”) in the United States are exemplars of these
approaches.106 RPSs mandate that electricity providers receive a
particular portion of their electricity from renewable sources, thus
necessitating the installation of those resources.107 Alternatively, tax
credits, by reducing net installation costs, also stimulate demand.108
Demand-side strategies, by stimulating demand for new technologies,
generate production, which enhances learning-by-doing and
economies of scale.109 Increased production can then reinforce these
effects by reducing costs, accelerating economies of scale, and
inducing further learning effects.110
To achieve these results, governments used policies that
created financial incentives or imposed quantity regulations to
generate demand for renewable energy.111 Government policies were
critical to incentivizing private activity that drove down costs.112
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between cost and volume in the
utility-scale solar power market. As solar power production and
installation accelerated, production moved down the cost curve,
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thereby further reducing costs.113 Experience demonstrates that costs
of new technologies initially decline as the technology improves; then,
costs fall in conjunction with increases in market volume.114
Figure 2115

Renewable energy markets actually contain many sub-markets,
and diffusion occurred uniquely within each. Thus, different
technologies developed at separate paces; each in unique locations on
their individual technology curves.116 Even individual technologies
may fall at different stages of the curve in different geographic levels.
Thus, local or national markets may be at one stage while the global
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technology curve may be at another.117 Because of these differences,
governments must be alert to tailor policies to local circumstances.118
This also suggests that policy makers should develop technologyspecific, rather than technology-neutral, policies.119 As a result,
applying policies that allow for individualization of application to
separate technologies is a critical consideration.
In conclusion, we can anticipate that the growth and diffusion
of CDR technologies will likely follow a recurring pattern. Armed with
this knowledge, governments can more accurately tailor policies to
enhance their ability to increase technological diffusion while
containing their costs. The experience of renewable energy diffusion,
discussed next, illustrates how policies can support diffusion, but also
highlights some of the problems that may arise if not diffused
correctly.
III.

POLICIES SUPPORTING RENEWABLE ENERGY DIFFUSION

The development of renewable energy exhibited the S-curve
pattern. This diffusion occurred in significant part because of a number
of policies that facilitated investment in these technologies. This next
section will examine these policies more closely and their effects on
renewable energy deployment.
A.

Feed-In Tariffs – The Basics

Feed-in tariffs (“FITs”) have been the most successful policy
for incentivizing the investment in and diffusion of renewable energy.
This is largely because they provide investors with certainty – a
guaranteed, profitable return on their investments. Unfortunately,
aspects of FITs that were instrumental in their success eventually
117
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created conditions that necessitated that many countries abandon their
FITs at the peak of their success. In other words, as technologies
reached the take-off stage, policies that were appropriate in the initial
phase needed to be modified under the new circumstances. This
suggests that awareness of diffusion patterns can guide policy makers
to tailor their policies to maximize effectiveness and control costs.
Germany and Spain first instituted elements of what were to
become their FITs in the 1970’s and 1980’s.120 Subsequently,
Germany enacted its FIT in 1991,121 and Spain followed in 1994.122
Since then, FITs have become widely adopted. FITs remain the most
prominent form of policy adopted to support renewable energy
production.123 Sixty five nations,124 and 110 jurisdictions overall, use
FITs.125 FITs have played particularly significant roles in Europe, and
most countries in Asia use them, as well.126
Feed-in-tarrifs have been quite successful, too. Most studies
have concluded that FITs significantly stimulated the growth of
renewable energy, especially in nations at the initial stages of
technology development.127 Often their performance has exceeded
projections.128 Researchers consider FITs to be the primary cause of
120
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renewable energy growth in their founding states of Germany and
Spain.129 Overall, analysts attribute 64% of global wind and 87% of
solar photovoltaic (“PV”) installations to the use of FITs policies.130
Three particular components typify feed-in tariff
agreements.131 The “feed-in” provision assures that generators of
electricity from renewable sources will have access to the grid.132 The
“tariff” requires utilities to purchase the electricity generated by
designated sources at predetermined rates.133 Finally, FITs contracts
are usually required to last an extended period of time, typically at least
15-20 years.134
Feed-in tariffs essentially guarantee payments at above-cost
rates to electricity producers through long-term contracts.135 FITs are
production-based incentives, as distinct from incentives awarded for
installation. Thus, FITs provide their benefits not when a renewable
energy facility is built, but when it actually generates electricity.136 The
theoretical basis supporting FITs is that assuring payment at a
guaranteed price removes market risk from investors. This helps to
attract capital.137 Indeed, the experience with FITs in Europe provides
evidence that they succeeded.138
129
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The 15-20 year length of FITs contracts plays an important
role. Sometimes referred to as payment length or payment duration,
this assures that generators will receive the FIT above-cost premium
for an extended period.139 This guaranteed duration is a key component
in providing a financial incentive to invest in a qualifying project.140
Long-term contracts provide other benefits, as well. With a
longer period of application, the time over which costs will be
recovered increases. This reduces the levelized cost for the project.141
One analysis concluded that the reduced capital costs can lower the
levelized costs by 10-30%.142 Long contracts assure stable revenue
streams, which also minimize investor risk.143 Long-term contracts, as
well as policy stability generally, provide assurance to the finance
sector, too, which facilitates financing.144 The length and stability of
FITs also encourages secondary industries, such as equipment supply,
to make the necessary investments to assure the long-term prospects
of the primary industry.145 Feed-in tariff legislation often also requires
standardized contracts. Their use simplifies project development since
it reduces or eliminates the negotiation process.146
The reimbursement rate set under FITs is critical.147 Policy
makers select from three different means to calculate the rate: actual
cost, avoided cost or value, or market price plus premium. A costbased price starts with the cost of electricity generation from the
renewable source and adds an amount to provide a guaranteed
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return.148 As such, this rate is independent of the market price.149 Costbased rates are most likely to assure developers and investors with their
guaranteed returns. Consequently, this method is particularly effective
in promoting market growth.150 Since the cost-based system derives
from the cost to generate electricity, the method inherently
differentiates
among
sources.
This
supports
portfolio
diversification.151 A drawback of this system is that it has higher
administrative costs because of the time and expertise required to
calculate accurate rates.152 Because of its assurance of a reasonable
return, the cost-based system was the most successful method to
incentivize renewable energy, and it was the most common method in
Europe.153
Cost-based rates utilize one of three methods. The first, a fixedprice system, establishes a guaranteed price for a fixed period, and
market fluctuations do not alter the rate.154 The second, a premiumprice method, provides a premium on top of the wholesale market
price. To minimize the effect of market fluctuations, some jurisdictions
set floors and ceilings for these rates.155 The third, a spot-market
system, sets a guaranteed payment level, and the FIT is determined as
the difference between the guaranteed payment level and the wholesale
market price.156
A second group of methods used to set FITs rates relies upon
external considerations. One category considers the fossil fuel costs
avoided through utilization of renewable energy.157 Another approach
attempts to set a value for the services provided by the alternative
148
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energy source by considering a number of avoided costs and resulting
benefits.158 These factors may include the costs of avoidance of
numerous harms: climate change impacts, adverse health effects, air
pollutants, and others.159 Value-based methods are less accurate means
to price FITs rates since many of their components are difficult to price
accurately and the eventual rate is unlikely to approximate the value
of different technologies.160 On the other hand, value-based
approaches are simpler to implement since they do not require
technology-by-technology determinations, but depend upon the
valuation of other factors.161
FITs can readily facilitate the development of multiple
technologies.162 One particular means to accomplish this is tariff
differentiation. This refers to assigning unique rates for separate
technologies based upon a range of factors. FITs can range from
undifferentiated to highly differentiated, upon a broad range of
considerations.163 Such differentiation can support various
technologies and even subsets of technologies (such as onshore and
158
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offshore wind). This can assure diversity in technologies with the
additional benefit of higher levels of technology penetration.164 FITs
can also differentiate based upon project size, which can support large,
industrial facilities as well as small-scale or residential projects.165
Policies can also differentiate by resource quality, which involves
recognition of different resource availability at particular sites. This
allows for higher prices where resources are less abundant (less windy
or sunny, for instance).166 Other types of differentiation have included
technology application (ground- or roof-mounted photovoltaics),
ownership type (public or private utility), and local content percentage
(to stimulate local industries and employment).167 Of course, the
greater the differentiation of a FIT scheme, the higher the
administrative costs that it will necessitate.168
A critical issue to address when structuring FITs involves the
recovery of the FITs premium. As discussed, FITs typically mandate
the payment of a premium exceeding the cost of generating
electricity.169 The utility customers pay the cost of the electricity they
use; the question remains of covering the premium. FITs can allocate
this cost recovery to ratepayers; alternatively, the state can cover this
premium, effectively shifting payment to the taxpayers.170 Policy
makers tend to favor ratepayer payment, viewing it as a more secure
and reliable means – payments included as part of a state budget can
become targets in budget cutting times.171
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Feed-In Tariffs – Illustrative Experiences

While FITs are now widespread, the experiences of several
nations – particularly those of Germany, Spain, and China – illustrate
many of the policy’s strengths and weaknesses. Germany and Spain,
the two founders of the FIT scheme, demonstrate FITs at their most
effective. However, they also highlight that inherent consequences of
successful FITs policies can necessitate substantial modifications, if
not outright abandonment. China, on the other hand, illustrates issues
that arise when FITs are adopted in larger, regionally diverse countries.
Its experience also suggests an approach to avoid some of the problems
confronted by Germany and Spain.
1.

Germany

As noted previously, in 1979, Germany, adopted a national
competition law, mandating purchases of renewable energy at avoided
costs.172 Twelve years later, Germany enacted its FIT, which required
the purchase of renewable energy through long-term, fixed-price
contracts.173 Under the German FIT, a surcharge on the bills of
residential customers covered the renewable energy subsidies.174
Germany modified its subsidies several times, most significantly in
2000.175 The 2000 amendments mandated that FITs contracts last for
at least 20-year terms and at prices that exceeded generators’ costs.176
Germany’s feed-in tariff (called the Erneuerbare-EnergienGesetz (“EEG”) (Renewable Energy Sources Act) after the 2000
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amendments)177 facilitated a rapid growth in the country’s renewable
energy generation. In the decade from 1990 to 2000, renewable energy
nearly doubled, rising from 3.4% to 6.2% of German electricity
production. By 2016, it had jumped to 31.7%.178 As of 2017, Germany
had solar PV capacity of 38 GW,179 despite having the solar potential
of Alaska.180
Several aspects of Germany’s FIT led to its success. The FIT
rate adjusted according to a project’s location. This adaptibility
increased the viability of projects in sub-optimal locations, which
promoted a more geographically-balanced distribution of wind
installations.181 The FIT also benefitted from relative stability and long
investment periods.182
Problems, however, began as the overall cost of the FIT rose.
To combat the rise in costs, starting with the EEG in 2000, Germany
instituted a policy of rate degression. Degression is a FIT policy that
decreases FITs rates by predetermined amounts.183 Reducing FITs
rates helps them to reflect technology cost reductions.184 In addition,
degression can be essential to contain overall policy cost as the number
of facilities receiving the FITs premium increases in response to lower
installation costs.185
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As the costs of the EEG mounted, Germany instituted more
aggressive degression policies. In 2009, it adopted a dynamic
degression policy, which considered the quantity of the previous year’s
installations when determining adjustments to the FITs rates.186 Two
years later, to keep up with rapidly-declining costs, Germany began to
adjust its solar PV FIT rates biannually.187 In 2013, as prices began to
fall even faster, Germany began degressing its FIT rates monthly.188
At the same time, because of rising total solar subsidies,
Germany capped the number of installations that could receive the
FITs rate.189 Nevertheless, the subsidy that ratepayers needed to cover
rose substantially. In 2000, the annual EEG subsidy was less than €1
billion; by 2016, it had risen to €25 billion.. 190 Twenty three billion
euros of this appeared as a surcharge on ratepayers’ bills, averaging
€1,060 per household.191
A number of compounding factors caused this jump in the FITs
surcharge. Prices for solar panels fell much faster than anticipated.
This led to rapidly rising profit margins, which encouraged developers
to install even more capacity.192 Degressing the subsidy more rapidly
merely prompted developers to rush to install even more projects
before rates fell further. Even though Germany eventually decided to
degress rates monthly, the outstanding 20-year guaranteed contracts
ensure that Germans will be paying the high FITs rates into the
2030’s.193 Even after its reforms, Germany’s residents still pay among
the highest electricity rates in Europe.194
In 2014, Germany approved a plan largely to replace its FITs
with auctions as the primary means to secure new renewable energy
186

Tanaka, supra note 121, at 6.
Davies, supra note 120, at 957-58.
188
Bentham Paulos, The Money Problem with Germany’s Renewable
Energy Law in 3 Charts, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 5, 2014),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-money-problem-with-thegerman-energiewende-in-3-charts.
189
Davies, supra note 120, at 958.
190
Böhringer, supra note 177, at 546.
191
Jeffrey Ball, Germany's High-Priced Energy Revolution, FORTUNE
(Mar. 14 2017, 6:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewableclean-energy-solar/.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Suzuki, supra note 176.
187

73

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

contracts.195 Initially, auctions were compulsory only for groundmounted PV. Germany amended the EEG again in 2017 to expand the
use of auctions for most renewable energy, except for small plants,
prototypes, and geothermal energy.196 Contracts for renewable energy
still included 20-year terms, but the price was determined through
auction rather than by the FITs.197 Within two years, prices for solar
PV dropped by almost 40%.198 Nevertheless, as of 2018, German
consumers were still paying subsidies totaling €27 billion.199
2.

Spain

In 1994, Spain adopted its FIT. The legislation, Royal Decree
2366/1994, mandated purchases of electricity from designated
technologies and set FIT rates of up to 20% above costs.200 Spain
further incentivized solar energy in 2007, when it set the highest rate
for PV in the world.201 Regarding overall renewable energy
installations, these policies were quite successful. In 1990, less than
1% of Spain’s electricity was sourced from renewables; by 2009, its
share had grown to 25%, and, by 2013, to 54%.202
Unlike Germany, Spain did not allow its utility companies to
pass on the premiums paid for renewable energy to their customers.203
Instead, it required the utilities to maintain deferral accounts. These
195
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accounts enabled the utilities to recover shortfalls from previous years
with subsequent years’ revenues.204 However, Spain kept utility prices
paid by consumers low. As a result, not only were utilities unable to
recoup previous shortfalls, the tariff deficit grew.205 The 2008 financial
crisis compounded problems. Unemployment in Spain rose above
20%, and electricity demand declined commensurately, resulting in
excess generating capacity.206 Spain had hoped that the utilities could
sell their tariff deficits as securitized debt, but this became impossible
in these new economic conditions.207 This forced the Spanish
government to bail out the utilities and provide backing for the tariff
debt.208 The Spanish government effectively assumed this debt.209 By
2013, accumulated debt had ballooned to €26 billion.210
Spain began introducing a series of measures to rein in its FIT.
In 2012, it modified its compensation scheme, no longer basing it upon
FITs rates, but instead assuring a “reasonable profitability” based upon
a company’s assets.211 Critically, Spain applied its reforms
retroactively. Consequently, older facilities that were constructed in
anticipation of receiving FITs rates stopped receiving subsidies
altogether.212
Not surprisingly, such retroactive changes prompted litigation,
but, importantly, on two fronts. Domestic investors brought suits in
Spanish courts, while international investors were able to pursue their
claims in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”).213 The Spanish courts upheld the FITs cuts.214
The international court, however, sided with the investors. Investors
have filed 26 cases in the ICSID over Spain’s altering of its FITs
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contract.215 Spain has already lost several of these cases, with the
judgments currently totaling in excess of $590 million.216
Although the Spanish FIT engendered substantial financial
burdens, it did accomplish its purpose. Not only did renewable energy
deployments take off under the FIT,217 the FIT established conditions
that enabled continued renewable energy investment. Indeed, in the
past three years, Spain has added 12 GW of solar power, an amount
that exceeded its remaining 9 GW of coal.218 More notably, it started
installing 5 GW of solar in 2018 despite the absence of subsidies.219
3.

China

In 2006, China enacted the framework for its FIT, and, three
years later, it established a specific FIT to support wind power.220 In
2011, China enacted a series of FIT policies to further support solar
PV.221 This accelerated investment in solar, with annual installations
rising from less than 5 GW in 2011 to nearly 35 GW in 2016.222
215
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Initially, China’s program provided a premium payment for renewable
sources, and the government paid the premium.223 Subsequently, in
2009, it imposed a surcharge on retail electricity rates to finance the
FIT.224
Despite the rapid rise in PV installations, China encountered
some issues in the application of its FIT program. China and its FIT
program are distinct from European countries and their policies in
several ways. First, China is a much larger country, and its renewable
energy resources are unevenly distributed and are most abundantly
available in the north, northwest, and south.225 Conversely, the
developed areas of the country are in central and eastern China.226 As
discussed below, these disparities would create implications for
China’s FIT structure. Second, unlike its contemporaries, the Chinese
FIT did not impose an automatic degression. It did incorporate a 30month tariff adjustment period,227 but this contrasts greatly to
Germany’s eventual adjustment period of one month.228 As in Europe,
solar PV prices in China declined rapidly, leading to highly profitable
FITs rates later in the period.229 The Chinese FIT policies did
incentivize solar PV, but developers built a substantial portion of the
facilities in the western portion of China. This area is rich in solar
resources, but it was relatively undeveloped and lacked transmission
lines to high-consumption provinces.230 Unused wind and solar
capacity worsened after 2014.231 In different regions of China, wasted
wind power reached 21% and unused solar neared 20%.232
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To address this problem, China regionalized its FIT system.
Under this approach, installations in areas receiving higher levels of
solar radiation earned lower tariffs.233 In addition, China also imposed
caps on the amount of PV installations built in each region.
Installations that exceeded the quota would not receive the region’s
FIT rate.234 However, China does not utilize a hard cap. Instead, the
central government sets the quotas, but it allows local governments to
approve developments. Local governments, of course, are incentivized
to approve projects to promote local economies. Consequently, they
typically approved more projects than their quota targeted.235
As elsewhere, the Chinese FIT began to require substantial
modification. Public support for the FIT began to wane, and tens of
billions of yuan of FITs subsidies were not provided.236 By 2017,
China’s deficit exceeded $16 billion.237 In 2017, China implemented a
trial renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) for wind power and solar
PV.238 The RPS applies to 31 cities and provinces,239 though full
implementation will not occur for at least five years.240
The experiences of these three countries illustrate the success
that FITs have had in promoting renewable energy; they also provide
cautionary tales about potential problems that might arise. Consistent
with the S curve pattern, slow technological development was
followed by explosive growth. Although the cost of renewable energy
233
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dropped dramatically, the long-term commitment that fostered that
growth became so burdensome that it necessitated policy changes,
including the elimination of the FIT.
C.

Feed-In Tariffs – Long Term Effects
1.

Problems

Despite the profound success of FITs, or possibly because of
it, countries utilizing them have eventually encountered difficulties.
Nations who have successfully employed FITs to incentivize
renewable energy installation during the early adoption stage have
often needed to restrict or abandon these policies as the technologies
advance through the take-off stage. A review of these developments
suggests that the dynamics of the S curve provide especially important
insights for the utilization and modification of FITs policies.
As noted, FITs have contributed substantially to the growth of
renewable energy throughout the globe.241 The experiences of
Germany and Spain have demonstrated, however, the long-run effects
of FITs can be problematic. FITs create market distortions that, as the
targeted technologies begin to take off, require modification of the
FITs or transition to alternative policies.242
Although FITs are very effective in their short- and
intermediate-term impacts on new technologies, a number of concerns
will typically arise over their long-term implementation.243 Long-run
utilization of FITs can cause fiscal burdens, market distortions, and
decreased innovation.244 Indeed, FITs caused heavy financial burdens
throughout the globe.245 An aspect of FITs that constitutes one of their
strengths – their contract requirements – inevitably leads to these
problems. FITs typically require 15-20 year contracts set at premium
levels.246 A problem inherent with FITs, however, is that governments
establish the tariff levels, while the costs of the technologies result
241
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from market forces.247 Cost declines are one of the expected benefits
of FITs.248 For example, wind power price reductions resulted from a
number of factors triggered by FITs, including economies of scale,
technological improvements, and learning by doing.249 Nevertheless,
FITs mandate the purchase of electricity at premium rates potentially
decades into the future. Consequently, declines in technology costs
stimulate booms in installations to take advantage of the resulting
profit margins, thereby triggering excessive subsidy burdens.250
These FIT surcharges, reflecting decades-long commitments,
must be passed on either to ratepayers or to taxpayers.251 Such
surcharges plagued the FITs utilized by Germany and Spain,
respectively.252 Consequently, both nations, whose FITs were models
for other countries, abandoned their FITs.253 The inevitability of such
problems was noted by Professors Davies and Allen, who wrote, “the
paradox inherent in feed-in tariffs is that they are designed to gradually
self-destruct.”254 While a substantial and growing surcharge is usually
inevitable (assuming FITs accomplish their intended purpose of
reducing costs and thereby stimulating installations). As discussed
below, jurisdictions can design FITs to compensate for these
developments.
Interestingly, in 2012 South Korea replaced its FIT with an
RPS.255 South Korea instituted this change for several reasons. The
247
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country paid its FIT subsidies through its national budget.256
Consequently, South Korea regularly confronted budget overruns
caused by its FIT.257 Particularly problematic was a rapid increase in
subsidies for solar photovoltaic.258 While the FIT was successful in
incentivizing a number of suppliers to install solar, this imposed
significant costs.259 Moreover, despite its success with solar, overall
the FIT underperformed. Specifically, South Korea sought to raise
renewable energy’s share of total electricity to 8%, but it reached only
3%.260 Accordingly, the country switched to an RPS in part to impose
a more results-oriented policy.261 The move worked, as renewable
energy installations increased three fold during the succeeding five
years when compared to the previous decade’s deployment under the
FIT.262
Besides their well-documented financial burdens, FITs suffer
from another concern: their continued promotion of technological
innovation is limited. If set too high, subsidy policies, such as FITs,
can encourage deployment of expensive and inefficient technologies,
locking-in these methods and failing to incentivize less mature
technologies.263 Moreover, since high-cost technologies receive
profitable returns on investments, FITs remove a primary incentive to
innovate and reduce costs.264 Eliminating – or at least reducing –
subsidies, such as FITs, forces industry to lower costs.265 Because of
the cost-plus-profit structure used by most FITs, they encourage
256
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exploitative behavior (increasing production of existing technologies)
over inventive activities (investing in research and development to
increase efficiencies and reduce costs).266
2.

Making FITs Work

To avoid the financial burdens inevitable with FITs, policy
makers can incorporate provisions to minimize or avoid their effects.
Because of the market changes FITs produce, FITs policies inevitably
need to be adjusted over time.267 Such adjustments need to be
proactive.268 If not adjusted timely, the disparity between technology
costs and tariffs fosters “rent-seeking”269 behavior, sparking a rise in
the number of installations as the FITs subsidy increases.270
FITs can avoid or at least minimize these consequences either
by anticipating changes or adjusting their tariffs as conditions change.
At the time that FITs are established, policy makers can select from a
range of options to adjust the FITs subsidy, ranging from systems that
are fully automatic to methods that require regulator
decisionmaking.271 Policy makers can anticipate market changes by
structuring planned degressions in their FITs tariffs by basing them on
the number of installations or overall cost.272 Often, such policies
266
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utilize predetermined triggers to initiate automatic adjustments.
Typical triggers include the passage of a specified period of time, the
achievement of specific capacity or generation levels, or total policy
costs.273 Alternatively, policy makers can design their FITs to require
regulators to evaluate market conditions periodically and to adjust their
tariffs accordingly.274
Because FITs control price rather than quantity,275 the amount
of actual installations under a FIT is often difficult to forecast.276 Thus,
when the FITs subsidies effectively increase because costs have
declined while the tariff has remained flat, adjustment mechanisms
help to control the volume of projects eligible for the tariff.277
Unfortunately, these approaches implicate a tension inherent in FITs
between maintaining price stability and adjusting tariffs to compensate
for changing circumstances.278 Injecting uncertainty through price
adjustments for as little as a few years into the future can increase the
perceived riskiness for financiers.279 Policy stability and transparency
better supports investors’ security.280 The detrimental effect of tariff
adjustments can be minimized by increasing the transparency of the
process – such as setting predetermined periods for adjustments or
tying adjustments to levels of deployment.281
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Thus, some adjustments are available within the FITs system.
Nevertheless, most nations chose to replace their FITs partially or
wholly with other policies.
3.

Transitioning to Auctions

To minimize the financial impacts of FITs, jurisdictions have
turned to another mechanism – tenders. As renewable energy
technologies have matured, their costs no longer impede investment.
Consequently, the FITs subsidy becomes unnecessary to encourage
deployment of these technologies.282 Furthermore, perpetuating FIT
subsidies during a technology’s take-off stage increases their financial
burden substantially.283 Accordingly, a number of countries have
turned to a process first used decades before to secure renewable
energy contracts – tenders.284 Tenders (also called “competitive
bidding,”285 “reverse auctions,”286 or just “auctions”287) enable
governments to control the costs of renewable energy deployment.
Governments determine the amount of capacity to be built, open the
contracts for these installations to bidders, and then contract with a low
bidder, who agrees to build the identified capacity.288 Some tenders
award the contract to the lowest bidder, while others may use multiple
criteria to select winners.289 Governments have sought fulfillment by
specific technologies or groups of technologies, or they have been
technology neutral.290
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283
SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 39.
284
Fell, supra note 114, at 3 (In the 1990’s under its Non Fossil Fuel
Obligation (“NFFO”), the United Kingdom accepted bids for electricity generation
from non-fossil fuel sources, including renewable energy.).
285
REN21, supra note 123, at 122-23.
286
Kilinc-Ata, supra note 275, at 84.
287
REN21, supra note 123, at 122-23.
288
Kilinc-Ata, supra note 275, at 84; SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 16
(Tenders may include ceiling prices to signal the maximum rate that will be
accepted, thereby assuring policy costs.).
289
SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 9, 18 (Additional criteria typically
involve factors such as local industrial development, project lead time, or
geographic distribution of installations.).
290
Malte Gephart, Corinna Klessmann & Fabian Wigand, Renewable
Energy– When are they (Cost-)Effective?, 28 ENERGY & ENV’T 145, 148 (2017).
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The use of tenders to source renewable energy has increased
significantly. Nations both in Europe and Asia have utilized tenders in
recent years. A number of European nations, including many
renewable energy leaders, have turned to tenders. In 2015, Germany,
the country that developed one of the model FITs, replaced its tariff
program with auctions.291 France, Denmark and the Netherlands,
among many others, are now using tenders as a primary means to add
renewables.292 Some of the largest tenders, however, occurred in Asian
countries, including China and India; Japan also has scheduled its own
tenders.293 Overall, the number of countries using auctions has grown
from 6 in 2005 to 67 in 2016.294
Not only do tenders avoid the burden of FITs subsidies, they
can reduce renewable energy costs. Tenders, by their nature,
encourage price competition.295 In a typical tender system, developers
bid to sell electricity they will generate from a specified technology.296
Thus, a primary function of tenders is to establish prices for electricity
generated from particular technologies and to award contracts.297 One
of the key advantages of tenders is that they determine prices through
competitive price discovery rather than by administrative
determination.298 Tenders, accordingly, are not truly support
instruments, but instead they constitute a design element that can work
with support mechanisms (such as a FIT or grid-connection
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REN21, supra note 123, at 122.
Id. at 122-23 (Tenders currently constitute the fastest-growing form of
renewable energy procurement in the United Kingdom.).
293
Id. at 123.
294
INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY [IRENA], RENEWABLE
ENERGY AUCTIONS: ANALYSING 2016 8, 16 (2017); UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra
note 124, at 12 (Typically, countries schedule tenders periodically.).
295
TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., THE NEXT GENERATION OF RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY POLICY: HOW RAPID CHANGE IS BREAKING DOWN CONVENTIONAL
POLICY CATEGORIES, 5 (2015).
296
UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 12.
297
COUTURE, supra note 295, at 12; SCHENUIT, supra note 220 at 11
(Another value of tenders is that they provide governments with a better ability to
control the installation of renewable energy and the particular mix of resources
installed.).
298
IEA, supra note 61, at 132; SCHENUIT, supra note 220 at 11 (By
determining prices through direct competition, tenders help avoid the windfall
profits, or rents, possible when prices fall faster than tariffs adjust.); IRENA, supra
note 294, at 17 (This price discovery process also not only informs the current
price, but also the historic trend informs future auction prices.).
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policies).299 Besides assisting with price discovery, another benefit of
tenders is that they reduce procurement costs.300 By forcing developers
to bid for the opportunity to sell electricity into the grid, tenders
incentivize developers to reduce costs to secure contracts for their
projects.301
Despite the popularity of tenders, critics have raised several
concerns about their use. A primary concern is that tenders limit the
volume of new installations.302 This in part results from the contrasting
299

SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 9; Oscar Fitch-Roy, David Benson &
Bridget Woodman, Policy Instrument Supply and Demand: How the Renewable
Electricity Auction Took over the World, 7 POL. & GOVERNANCE 81, 82 (2019)
(Jurisdictions utilize tenders in a number of different capacities relative to FITs. In
many instances, tenders replace their FITs.); Paolo Cozzi, ASSESSING REVERSE
AUCTIONS AS A POLICY TOOL FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENT 30 (2012),
https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/files/2018/02/May12CozziReverseAuctions.pdf (In
others, they merely supplement FITs policies.); REN21, supra note 123, at 132 (In
some instances, countries use tenders side-by-side with FITs, typically awarding
contracts for larger contracts through tenders while using FITs to support smaller
projects (and, typically, smaller developers).).
300
Fowlie, supra note 180.
301
Brian Parkin, Germany Pits Solar Against Wind for First Time in
Power Auction, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (Feb. 21, 2018)., 11:41 AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X7R3STGO000000?bna_news_filter=e
nvironment-andenergy&jcsearch=BNA%252000000161b918d846a17fb9da38360000#jcite.
302
Fell, supra note 114, at 1; Jan Kreiss, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, & MarieChristin Haufe, Appropriate Design of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support –
Prequalifications and Penalties, vol.101 ENERGY POL’Y, 512, 512 (2017) (stating,
actually, that “tenders massively curb the expansion rates of renewable energies”)
(An initial concern regarding the replacement of FITs with tenders was the latter’s
realization rates. Low realization rates – awarded bidders failing to generate the
amount of electricity contracted – characterized tenders.) (This results from bidders
submitting low bids that do not cover project costs.); Gephart, supra note 290, at
151. (For example, early tenders suffered from realization rates below 40% (38%
under the UK’s NFFO program from 1990 to 1998, 30% for a geothermal auction
by The Netherlands’ in 2011, and 30% for an onshore wind auction in Brazil in
2009-10).); Kreiss, supra note 302, at 512, 512-13 (The low realization rates have
had different causes. For instance, in the United Kingdom, tenders utilized low
financial prequalification standards; in Brazil, conversely, the unavailability of grid
connections rendered timely satisfaction of realization requirements impossible.);
Kreiss, supra note 302, at 512-23 (Governments can avoid the problem of low
realization rates, however, by imposing prequalification requirements or penalties.)
(Prequalification requirements may include satisfaction of general criteria (such as
experience, technical ability, or financial strength) or fulfillment of project-specific
actions (such as submission of a land-use plan or a feasibility study)); Sandra
Enkhardt, Germany Reports High Realization Rate for PV Projects Selected in
Auctions, PV MAG. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.pv-
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natures of tenders and the mechanism often preceding them, FITs. A
critical benefit of FITs is that any investor in a qualifying project is
assured of receiving the tariff for generated electricity.303 Conversely,
tenders award contracts only to those projects necessary to achieve a
particular installation or budget goal.304 Indeed, several nations have
turned to tenders to slow down the installation of renewable energy
resources. Countries with mature solar markets, for instance, have used
tenders to address subsidy budget deficits, market saturation, and grid
management concerns.305
A critical distinction of tenders from FITs is that tender
systems reduce investor certainty. Since tenders cannot assure
investors of securing contracts unless they submit a winning bid,
tenders inject uncertainty into the development phase of a project.306
Not only do tenders instill doubt, they also impose new administrative
costs in the form of bid preparation.307 This can be especially
problematic for smaller developers.308 Finally, tenders tend to favor a
few, dominant players over smaller participants. Several
characteristics of tenders – including administrative and financial
requirements – discourage engagement by small actors.309
Nevertheless, a number of countries have begun using tenders
to secure renewable energy production. France was one of the first
countries to do so. In 2001, it applied FITs to projects under 12 MW

magazine.com/2018/01/09/germany-reports-high-realization-rate-for-pv-projectsselected-in-auctions/ (Penalties can include lower levels of financial support, a
shortened support period, termination of the contract, or exclusion from future
auctions.); Kreiss, supra note 302, at 513 (Accordingly, more recent realization
rates have exceeded 90%.).
303
Schmalensee, supra note 137, at 50.
304
IRENA, supra note 294, at 17.
305
Sonal Patel, More Countries Banking on Competitive Auctions over
Subsidies to Stimulate Renewables, POWER MAG. (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.powermag.com/more-countries-banking-on-competitive-auctionsover-subsidies-to-stimulate-renewables/.
306
IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 132.
307
SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 11.
308
Id.
309
Fell, supra note 114, at 9, 18 (On the other hand, Fell acknowledges
that tenders can be helpful in procuring investments from large investors for more
sizeable projects that help reduce costs.).
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and tenders to larger projects.310 Ten years later, France extended its
tender program to smaller projects and broadened it to cover rooftop
solar.311 Both FITs and tenders were successful. In fact, as of 2014,
38% of the country’s solar PV capacity resulted from its FIT while the
remaining 62% derived from tenders.312
Another country now relying upon tenders is Germany. As
previously discussed, in response to high electricity costs, Germany
abandoned its FIT.313 In its place, Germany instituted tenders for
renewable energy procurement.314 It started with auctions for solar
power in 2015.315 Germany then added tenders for onshore wind,
offshore wind, and biomass.316 In the eleven solar auctions Germany
has conducted since 2015, tender prices fell steadily from 9.17
cents/kWh to 4.59 cents/kWh in less than three years.317 Furthermore,
the realization rate of the first four tenders (for which contract
completion data is available) ranged between 90% and 99.9%.318 The
tenders have seen such successes that Germany’s parliament approved
legislation to expand the country’s use of auctions. In fact, the
parliament expects renewable energy’s share of Germany’s electricity
production to rise from 38% to 65% by 2030.319 Furthermore, tenders
have achieved their intended goal of controlling renewable energy
costs. After the adoption of tenders, renewable energy prices fell to
levels comparable to those of fossil fuel sources.320

COUTURE, supra note 295, at 5, 8 (Advantages of this “layered”
approach include enabling better control over market segment development and
ensuring growth of multiple project size categories.).
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https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/german-wind-solartenders-expand-as-sights-set-on-coals-exit.
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Following this lead, other countries have adopted tenders as
well. The two largest developing countries, China and India, have
decided to use tenders to secure future renewable energy installations.
In 2018, China announced that it would end its FIT for utility-scale
projects and require the use of tenders to set their prices.321 India also
has turned to tenders to increase its renewable energy installations.
Specifically, it will use tenders to secure 500 GW of renewable energy
generation capacity by 2028.322
Several jurisdictions and utilities in the United States have
begun turning to tenders, too. Since 2010, California has enabled
investor-owned utilities to use tenders to procure RPS-eligible
renewable energy production from small producers.323 In addition, the
PJM Interconnection324 and utilities in Arizona, Massachusetts, and
Nevada, have all recently enacted tenders.325
Tenders have helped to lower the costs of renewable energy
installations. They have established lower prices for solar PV, onshore
wind, and offshore wind.326 For projects coming online by 2023, costs
Emma Foehringer Merchant, China’s Bombshell Solar Policy Shift
Could Cut Expected Capacity by 20 Gigawatts, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 6, 2018),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/chinas-bombshell-solar-policycould-cut-capacity-20-gigawatts#gs.pfkhc6; SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 40
(China first implemented a tender in 2003, six years before it established its FIT. A
wide variance in bid prices, however, reflected the industry’s still immature state.).
322
Renewables Continue To Add Capacity Despite Glut, ENERGY NEWS
MONITOR (May 13, 2019), https://www.orfonline.org/research/energy-newsmonitor-volume-xv-issue-48-50758/; Gephart, Klessmann & Wigand, supra note
290, at 155 (Brazil, another developing country, has also turned to tenders for new
wind installations, setting contract prices that represent a 60% reduction from its
FITs rates.).
323
Renewable Auction Mechanism, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (2020),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/renewable_auction_mechanism/.
324
Who We Are, PJM (1999-2020) https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/whowe-are.aspx PJM (Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that
coordinates wholesale electricity transactions in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.).
325
SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 27.
326
IEA, Have the Prices from Competitive Auctions become the "New
Normal" Prices for Renewables? (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.iea.org/articles/havethe-prices-from-competitive-auctions-become-the-new-normal-prices-forrenewables [hereinafter IEA, Prices]
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range from 45% to 67% lower.327 Thus, tenders have provided a means
to contain costs in the take-off stage after FITs have successfully
promoted these technologies.
D.

Renewable Portfolio Standards
1.

A Brief Review

RPSs have also played a prominent role in incentivizing
renewable energy deployment. A quick review of RPSs follows to
enable a comparison to FITs, leading to a proposal to incorporate
aspects of both policies to accelerate CDR development.328
RPSs implement a different approach from that used by FITs,
and they have unique strengths and weaknesses. RPSs mandate that
electricity producers must generate or purchase pre-established
minimum percentages of their power from designated (usually
renewable) sources.329 The generation of electricity from such sources
is recognized through the provision of renewable energy credits
(“RECs”).330 RPSs then utilize markets to set prices for renewable
energy by allowing trading of these RECs.331 The trading of RECs in
a market fosters price competition.332 RPSs have been popular and
successful in incentivizing renewable energy development. While
RPSs are not as widespread as FITs, as of 2017, at least 67 countries
had set RPS-like targets for renewable capacity or generation.333
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Id.; IRENA, supra note 294, at 21 (A number of factors, however,
determine the prices established by the auctions and their eventual success in
securing the electricity sought. These include any land acquisition costs, resource
quality, and project size.).
328
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(2019).
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A major distinction between FITs and RPSs involves the
certainty for developers of their return on investment.334 FITs, of
course, guarantee the purchase of electricity generated by qualified
sources.335 Power producers in RPS jurisdictions, however, submit
proposals through competitive solicitations.336 A competitive
solicitation can impose significant burdens on applicants, such as the
costs of developing the proposal, the risks of failing to secure the bid,
and more complicated financing arrangements (since the return on
investment is not assured).337 Thus, RPSs not only shift risk to
investors, they also raise investors’ transaction costs.338
While basic RPSs do not incentivize specific technologies,
policy makers can add certain provisions – called multipliers and carve
outs – to enable RPSs to promote particular technologies. Carve outs
identify minimum levels of electricity to be produced from a particular
type of source. These targets are “carved out” of the overall renewable
energy percentage for the jurisdiction’s electricity.339 Conversely,
multipliers allow the generation of electricity by particular energy
sources to earn multiples of credits as compared to electricity produced
by other identified sources.340 For instance, seven states use multipliers
for solar, with multipliers of credits ranging from two to three times
the standard one credit for each megawatt of generation by other
renewable energy sources.341 One benefit that both carve outs and
multipliers share is that jurisdictions can apply these devices to several
technologies at the same time, thereby supporting multiple
undeveloped methods. Delaware, for instance, uses multipliers for fuel
cells, solar, and offshore wind.342 New Mexico, on the other hand,

334
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carves out minimum percentages of its RPS goals for solar, wind, and
“other renewables.”343
2.

Differences between FITs and RPSs

At a fundamental level, the two systems differ in the focus of
their approaches. FITs are price-based policies, whereas RPSs are
quantity based.344 Under FITs, regulators determine the price for
power from particular sources, and the market determines the quantity
to be installed.345 Conversely, regulators under RPSs set the quantity
of electricity to be sourced from designated technologies, and the
market establishes the price.346
The different structure of these policies alters the allocation of
risks. RPSs, which rely on competitive solicitations, shift more risk to
investors.347 By requiring particular quantities of renewable energy at
whatever price providers can acquire it, RPSs incentivize cost
reduction, while the risk of project acceptance and pricing falls on
investors.348 FITs facilitate the development of new technologies by
requiring investors to assume only a minimal level of risk.349 The
guaranteed contract of FITs enables developers to avoid competitive
solicitations. Also, they can secure financing for larger proportions of
their projects, which helps lower the cost of financing.350 Not only do
FITs assure profitability, they also provide predictable returns.351
Because of the structural differences between FITs and RPSs,
these policies tend to be most effective in incentivizing different types
of investors and technologies. Quantity-based policies, such as RPSs,
are better suited to more mature technologies.352 In addition, because
of the uncertainty of return on investment with the competitive
solicitation method used with RPSs, larger investors are better able to
343

Id. at 287.
Kilinc-Ata, supra note 275, at 84.
345
Kwon, Rent, supra note 183, at 677.
346
Id.
347
Cory, supra note 126, at 9.
348
Kwon, Rent, supra note 183, at 677.
349
Abolhosseini, supra note 161, at 884.
350
Cory, supra note 126, at 9.
351
Zhang, supra note 236, at 427.
352
Francesco Nicolli & Francesco Vona, Heterogeneous Policies,
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weather the costs and risks associated with starting projects.353 RPSs
also tend to favor projects with long-term targets (10-15 years) for
profitability.354 This also incentivizes more mature technologies,
which are closer to competitiveness.355 Because RPSs set quantity
requirements and allow others to choose the technology with which to
satisfy the mandate, they encourage lower-cost technologies,356 which
also tends to incentivize cost-reducing innovation.357
Conversely, guaranteed-price policies, such as FITs, tend to
facilitate the development of technologies in their initial phases.358
FITs also insulate covered technologies from competition with other
technologies. Thus, they are especially effective at supporting new
technologies that are not yet competitive.359
The risk shifting of these two policies also impacts regulators.
The reduced risk encountered by investors with FITs does not
disappear. Instead, FITs shift risk from investors to regulators.360 In
FITs systems, regulators must set the FITs rates. If regulators set the
rates too high, the number of investors and projects will increase, but
the overall policy costs will rise. If the rates are too low, market
expansion will be constrained, since only the most efficient projects
will be viable.361 The precision of these rates is essential because
excess premiums would eventually burden ratepayers or taxpayers.362
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Because FITs limit the risks to investors, they have been the
more popular policy.363 In general, studies have found that FITs have
more effectively promoted renewable energy development than any
other policy.364 Because of this difference, a study of 35 countries
concluded that FITs mitigate investor risks and encourage up to four
times the amount of renewable energy deployment as that incentivized
by RPSs.365
Thus, each policy has its own strengths. RPSs support a
managed growth of technologies and encourage innovation and cost
reduction. FITs, however, have proven to be more robust promoters of
new technologies.
E.

Tax Credits and Cash Grants

While FITs and RPSs were the primary drivers of renewable
energy deployment, other policies played significant roles. In the
United States, tax credits and cash grants were particularly
supportive.366 Two types of tax credits have been used, one based on
actual electricity generation and the other on the amount of investment
in new technologies.
The United States enacted a production tax credit (“PTC”) that
became a primary driver of wind energy.367 Congress established the
wind PTC in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. As originally enacted, the
PTC provided a tax credit for the first ten years of operation of a wind
turbine.368 It provided a credit based upon the amount of annual
electricity production from the turbine.369 Thus, a primary benefit of
363
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the PTC is that it subsidizes the specific activity – electricity
generation by wind turbines – Congress sought to encourage.370
Numerous studies have found that the PTC successfully
encouraged wind power installations.371 Researchers have found that
the wind PTC has had a consistently positive and highly significant
effect on wind technology deployment.372 Furthermore, the PTC
enhances the effectiveness of other supportive policies, most
noticeably RPSs.373
One limitation inherent with the PTC is that, as a credit against
taxes, it requires tax liability to provide value.374 Because of the
upfront costs involved with wind installations, however, developers do
not typically produce profits (and the resulting tax liabilities) until after
10 years or more of operations.375 Thus, to benefit from the PTC, many
developers needed to use tax equity financing to monetize their tax
benefits sooner.376 This process reduced the effective amount of
financial support provided directly to the targeted activity, renewable
energy production.377
Despite the PTC’s success in growing the wind industry,
uncertainty concerning its availability negatively impacted its
effectiveness.378 Congress repeatedly enacted the PTC for only a
limited period of time and often let the credit expire before renewing
it. Since the PTC’s first enactment in 1992, Congress has needed to
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renew it eleven times.379 On six of these occasions, Congress actually
allowed the PTC to expire before extending it.380 Figure 3 illustrates
this history of the PTC’s availability and its impact on wind power
installations.
Figure 3381

The PTC’s erratic availability reduced its effectiveness. The
Department of Energy analyzed the effect of the starts and stops of the
credit on the ability of developers to plan their projects. It used the date
of congressional enactment and the expiration of the PTC to calculate
a planning window for each PTC period.382 The Department found that
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14 such periods have arisen since 1992, and the average length of these
periods was only 27.5 months.383
These regular expirations and extensions negatively impacted
wind development.384 They also engendered boom-and-bust cycles in
the industry.385 As illustrated by Figure 3, the cycles exhibit strong
growth followed by dramatic slowdowns.386 During the slowdowns,
installations fell from 76% to as much as 93%.387 These boom-andbust cycles caused a number of problems within the wind industry
itself and its supporting industries.388 The drop in demand destabilized
the industry’s labor force and disrupted manufacturing processes and
supply chains.389 These disruptions impaired the industry’s ability to
take advantage of favorable developments, such as the tax credits’
renewal or strong market conditions.390 They also increased prices for
goods and labor.391
These cycles do, however, demonstrate the impact of the PTC
on the wind industry.392 The effectivenss of the PTC is apparent by the
dropoff in installations illustrated by Figure 3 when Congress allowed
the PTC to expire. Consequently, Congress has amended the PTC to
apply to additional technologies, including biomass, geothermal,
landfill gas, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower, and marine
and hydrokinetic facilities.393
383
Id. (The author calculated more periods than extensions because, in
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Another tax credit that Congress used to stimulate renewable
energy was the investment tax credit (“ITC”). Congress first applied
the ITC to renewable energy investments in the Energy Tax Act of
1978.394 In contrast to the PTC, which rewards electricity
generation,395 the ITC mainly rewards the investment in equipment
that enables that generation.396 Thus, the ITC does not require – and,
consequently, does not ensure – the actual generation of electricity by
renewable sources. The ITC provides a credit of 30% of the investment
in renewable energy equipment.397
Investors typically used the PTC for their investments in wind
power, while the ITC has been the credit of choice for investment in
solar power.398 The distinction arose largely because of the differences
in electricity generation by the two sources of power.399 Historically,
the per kilowatt capital cost of solar has been higher than that of wind.
Thus, the ITC was more attractive for solar investments than those in
wind.400 Conversely, wind’s higher generating capacity made the PTC
more appealing to its investors.401 In fact, the PTC could provide up to
double the credit for wind developments that some solar projects could
earn.402
Conclusions about the success of the ITC in incentivizing solar
energy investments are mixed. Investment in solar power has
undergone a significant increase since the passage of the ITC.403
394
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Nevertheless, a number of considerations call into question the ITC’s
role in causing this rise. For instance, the acceleration in solar
installations does not coincide with favorable changes to the ITC.404
Furthermore, solar energy has grown at similar levels worldwide.405
Finally, analysts generally consider the PTC to yield more renewable
energy per dollar of subsidy than has the ITC.406
Because of the necessity of having income to benefit from the
tax credits, the government turned to a different mechanism during the
Great Recession. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (the Stimulus Bill) established section 1603 cash grants.407 This
provision enabled developers to choose to receive cash grants of up to
30% of their investments instead of receiving either the production or
investment tax credits.408 Congress enacted this provision in
recognition of reduced investor demand for tax credits during the
recession.409
Since cash grants provide financial benefits directly to
investors, they have certain advantages over tax credits. Credits, as
discussed before, require developers either to generate taxable income
to benefit from the credit or to engage outside investors to monetize
their tax beneifts.410 As a result, a significant portion of the subsidy
goes to the outside investors and to efforts to identify and attract
them.411 Consequently, analysts have concluded that one dollar of
direct cash has twice the benefit of one dollar of tax credit. 412 Not
surprisingly, in the period after the passage of the Stimulus Bill,
developers demonstrated a clear preference for cash grants over the tax
credits.413
Another criterion upon which to evaluate these three
mechanisms is their allocation of project risks. Since the PTC rewards
production, project developers assume the risk of its
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nonperformance.414 Conversely, the value of the ITC to the developer
depends upon the amount of its investment, not its production.415 Thus,
the ITC does not assure electricity generation. Similarly, the
government determines the amount of Section 1603 grants with
reference to developer investments, not electricity generation.416 Thus,
the PTC better assures that the targeted benefit will actually be
produced.
IV.

USING RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES TO INCREASE CDR
DIFFUSION

Diffusion theory and experience with renewable energy can
help inform the crafting of policies to incentivize the development and
deployment of CDR. The renewable energy experience suggests
several principles that should guide these policies. Policies should
provide for differentiation along a series of criteria, be stable until
technologies are able to mature, but be able to adapt to new
circumstances as technologies do reach later stages of diffusion. The
renewable energy experience suggests that FITs are robust supporters
of new technologies. However, they might work best operating in an
RPS structure that assures steady growth while incentivizing least-cost
technologies. At early stages of diffusion, additional policies that can
subsidize new technologies, such as cash grants, have proven to be
effective. As technologies become mature, subsidies need to be
reduced and replaced with policies such as tenders that will contain
costs.
A. Principles to Guide CDR Policies
Diffusion theory and the recent experiences with renewable
energy development suggest several principles that should guide
policies intended to promote CDR. A critical principle that must be
incorporated into CDR policies is differentiation. To best promote
CDR technologies, policy makers should develop technology-specific,
rather than technology-neutral, policies.417 Policies must differentiate
among technologies to take into account different stages of
development, to recognize disparate geographic resources, and to
assure the development of a variety of different technologies. Tailoring
414
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policies to specifc technologies facilitates the development of less
mature – and typically more expensive – technologies.418 Experience
with renewable energy illustrates that technologies develop at different
paces,419 necessitating policies targeted to their different locations on
the S curve.420 Similarly, CDR technologies currently are at different
levels of development,421 and, therefore, will benefit from the adoption
of policies that allow for differentiation.
Differentiation will have additional benefits. It will enable
rates to recognize the geographic disparity of resources.422 It also
lowers the overall costs of the policies, since differentiation facilitates
reducing support for technologies further along on the diffusion
curve.423
Tailoring is also important to avoid leaving technologies
undeveloped. Essentially, those benefits that arise with technology
maturity – economies of scale and learning by doing – become
hindrances to the development of other technologies. Positive
feedbacks and increasing returns to scale foster path dependency.424
Path dependency locks in established technologies, not because they
are superior, but because they are widely used.425
Once again, renewable energy provides examples of these
concepts. For instance, the potential for Spain to generate significant
quantities of electricity through solar power is substantial.426
Nevertheless, Spain’s policies favored wind power and locked in wind
technology over others, including solar.427 Another energy source that
globally remains largely fallow is tidal power. Typical estimates
calculate that tidal energy generation could exceed 100 GW
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worldwide.428 Nevertheless, a lack of support for tidal power research
has limited its development. Recently, Naval Group SA, a pioneer in
tidal power, decided to shift its focus to offshore wind power because
of limited support for tidal energy and competition from offshore
wind.429 Other recent decisions by France to limit support for tidal
projects and by the United Kingdom to require tidal projects to
compete with offshore wind influenced Naval Group’s decision.430
The United Kingdom’s focus on offshore wind indirectly impacted
marine technologies by limiting their relative competitiveness.431 To
avoid such results, CDR technology policy needs to maintain support
for still-developing technologies before their ultimate value has
become apparent.432 This will be especially important since analyses
conclude that multiple CDR technologies should be developed to
sequester the amount of carbon required.433
Experience with renewable energy also demonstrates that
stability enhances the effectiveness of policies. The contrast between
the results in Germany434 with FITs and the uneven history of wind
power installations in the United States435 illustrates the importance of
this factor. As demonstrated by the wind PTC, short-term extensions
and occasional expirations of the credit injected uncertainty into the
wind power market, leading to drops in installations greater than
90%.436 Not only did this disrupt the clear upward trend in
installations,437 it also impacted the wind industry’s employment,
finances, and supply chain.438 Conversely, Germany structured its FIT
428
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to provide decades-long certainty to investors.439 Without doubt, this
disparity helped wind power to achieve its fast growth in that
country.440
Although CDR policies need to be stable, they must also be
flexible. Diffusion theory tells us that technology deployment will
follow a predictable – yet changing – pattern.441 In general, we can
expect that CDR technologies will first undergo a period of innovation
and early adoption.442 This phase is characterized by limited diffusion
as costs remain high.443 During this period, supportive policies that
lower the effective cost of installation will be especially helpful in
promoting diffusion, since diffusion normally proceeds slowly.444 As
CDR technologies advance to the adoption stages, the costs of
installations can overwhelm governments relying upon subsidies.445
Thus, policies will need to adapt to contain their overall costs.446 This
will require regular reviews of market conditions to determine the
optimal time to enact transitional policies.447 Alternatively, they could
rely upon predetermined levels, typically overall cost or total
installations, to implement changes in support.448 Regardless of the
particular mechanism, the policies will need to be able to adapt as the
technologies mature.
B. A Policy Proposal to Support CDR Development and
Deployment
Diffusion theory, the renewable energy experience, and the
principles identified above can help guide the establishment of policies
that can accelerate development and deployment of CDR technologies.
At the initial stages, policies need to encourage investment, reduce
costs, and provide stability. During the take-off stage, monitoring of
changing conditions will be critical, with an expectation that policies
will need either to evolve or be replaced to best fit new circumstances
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and to contain the overall costs of these policies. Finally, as markets
begin to saturate, most policies can be removed altogether.
In light of the success demonstrated by FITs in promoting wind
and solar power, FITs should be used as an initial policy to support
technologies that capture and sequester carbon. Cost-based rates with
premiums should be used since this method inherently differentiates
among sources, which, among other benefits, supports portfolio
diversification.449 FITs have several characteristics that should
contribute to the acceleration of CDR installations. First, their
premium rates will ensure that investors will receive a favorable return,
thereby encouraging investment.450 Second, FITs incorporate long
contract periods, which provide important stability for new
technologies.451 By setting different rates for different technologies,
FITs also can promote multiple technologies at once.452 Differentiated
rates also can recognize geographic differences in technologies’
effectiveness and tailor rates accordingly,453 thereby controlling
overall costs.454
FITs, however, have not proven to be perfect. Although FITs
usually fostered substantial renewable energy growth,455 the costs of
this growth led many FITs countries to abandon or severely restrict
these policies as technologies matured.456 Both in Europe and Asia
nations have been shifting away from FITs to market-based
methods.457 In other instances, they failed to stimulate the anticipated
growth in renewable energy.458 Thus, modifications will be required to
ensure that CDR installations achieve their targeted level while
avoiding burdensome costs. To ensure that installations continue even
when FITs are reduced or eliminated, FITs should be used in
conjunction with RPSs.
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Typically, jurisdictions have approached the two policies as
mutually exclusive alternatives.459 However, in recent years analysts
have begun to suggest that FITs and RPSs can be used jointly, either
as separate but parallel measures or with FITs serving to promote
certain technologies within a broader RPS structure.460 Using the two
policies jointly can be more effective since this approach is able to
combine the policies’ most effective provisions.461 Furthermore,
analysts have concluded that use of both policies increase their
effectiveness.462 Importantly, both policies can support tailoring for
specific technologies.463
The RPS structure can readily incorporate FITs policies.464
RPSs can act as a framework with which other policies can be
integrated to achieve the RPSs’ requirements.465 With their tradable
certificates, RPSs create markets for technologies; FITs can encourage
investment in the technologies intended to populate these markets466
and help achieve the RPS quotas.467 Specifically, FITs and RPSs can
interact in several ways. First, FITs can provide a more certain means
to award contracts as compared to the competitive solicitation process
typically used in RPS jurisdictions.468 Second, jurisdictions can use
459
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FITs to award contracts when no competitive solicitations are
pending.469 Third, FITs can work in conjunction with RPSs, providing
a means to promote targeted technologies.470 In place of or in addition
to carve outs and multipliers, RPSs can utilize FITs to encourage
investment into technologies jurisdictions favor or seek to develop.
FITs can be especially helpful when RPSs are first implemented as a
means to accelerate investment in undeveloped technologies.471
Finally, because they lower barriers to market participation, FITs
enable governments to encourage investment by small investors.472
Using the RPS framework provides several crucial benefits.
RPSs can serve as baseline policies that assure smooth and continuous
growth.473 RPSs can also be helpful after technologies have progressed
along the diffusion curve.474 They can enable jurisdictions to avoid the
financial burden of additional installations with FIT subsidies while
assuring continued installations of the technology.475 As noted
previously, South Korea replaced its FIT with an RPS, and renewable
energy installations then increased three fold over their rate under the
South Korean FIT.476 Furthermore, with their utilization of
competitive markets to encourage investment in lowest-cost
technologies, RPSs can help control the burden of FITs subsidies.477
One country that is combining FITs with RPSs is China. It is
utilizing a portfolio approach to renewable energy development,
combining RPS policies with FITs and other policies.478 As noted
previously, China enacted its RPS in response to problems with its
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FIT.479 Specifically, the FIT incentivized the development of solar PV
in resource-rich portions of the country, but low development also
characterizes these regions.480 Becaue of a lack of long-distance
transmission lines, this PV development – and its attendant costs –
were wasted.481 China then imposed an RPS to control PV waste, to
balance special deployment, and to contain policy cost.482 Thus, it
turned to RPSs to assure controlled and directed growth while using
FITs to incentivize that growth.
Finally, to enhance the effectiveness of these policies,
governments should incorporate cash grants and tax credits. Because
many CDR technologies are still nascent,483 we can anticipate that
most CDR developers will have minimal taxable income for several
years. Cash grants will usually be most effective in these
circumstances since they will assure that a larger proportion of the
government’s support will stay with the developers.484 Still, the
production tax credits can be valuable tools to incentivize more mature
technologies that are already able to produce the desired product,
carbon sequestration.485 The final mix of subsidies may be less
important than the fact that subsidies are available. From the
perspective of investors, analysts have found that the extent of price
support is at least as important as the type of instrument that provides
it.486
As CDR technologies mature and enter the take-off phase,
subsidies – FITs, grants, and tax credits – will need to be reduced to
avoid excessively burdensome costs. Accordingly, administrators will
need to monitor installations and overall costs. As both rise, they will
need to degress the FIT rates and prepare to transition from subsidies
to tenders.487 Experience demonstrates that auctions can work well
479
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either independently or in conjunction with broader structures, such as
FITs or RPSs. Tenders can, for instance, serve several different
functions within FITs. Jurisdictions can use tenders to procure larger
projects,488 leaving FITs to support smaller installations.489
Alternatively, governments can use tenders as a device to determine
the appropriate price level for the FITs subsidies.490
The German experience illustrates another role for tenders.
First, it used FITs to assure predictability of renewable energy
investments. After the technologies matured, it then replaced its FITs
with auctions, thereby not only controlling its subsidy costs but also
lowering the price of energy.491 Tenders also have worked successfully
within the RPS structure. New York492 and California493 provide
examples of states that use tenders to secure renewable energy projects
FITs that might better control overall costs is Advance Market Commitments
(“AMCs”). AMCs arose as a means to incentivize the production of vaccines for
developing countries.) (They consist of a pool of funds available to producers of
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to satisfy RPS requirements. Furthermore, combining tenders with
RPSs will overcome one of the common objections to tenders –
underrealization of installation targets.494 The rising minimum
requirements under RPSs will assure that installations will continue to
achieve higher targets.495
CONCLUSION
Virtually all projections conclude that keeping warming under
2°C will require the use of CDR technologies, and in substantial
quantities. Although many such technologies are available, few are
ready to be deployed at scale, and many still require significant
development. Diffusion theory helps demonstrate how this
deployment may unfold, but, even more importantly, how policies may
accelerate this process while containing its costs. The recent
experience of renewable energy deployment points to several policies
that may accelerate the diffusion of CDR technologies. The RPS
structure can set rising targets for deployment and incentivize
continual innovation of mature technologies. FITs provide conditions
favorable to encouraging investment and deployment of stilldeveloping technologies. Importantly, however, FIT premiums must
be reduced or eliminated as the technologies pass through the take-off
stage of the S curve. At this point, RPS minimums and tenders should
be able to ensure that diffusion continues and does so at the lowest
costs possible.
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